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Abstract– Parrondo’s paradox occurs in sequences of
games in which a winning expectation may be obtained
by playing the games in a random order, even though
each game in the sequence may be lost when played in-
dividually. Several variations of Parrondo’s games with
paradoxical property have been introduced. In this pa-
per, I examine whether Parrondo’s paradox occurs or
not in scale free networks. Two models are discussed
by some theoretical analyses and computer simulations.
As a result, I prove that Parrondo’s paradox occurs
only in the second model.
I. NTRODUCTION
The original Parrondo’s game consists of two losing
games A and B where each is played by only one player.
In the game A, only one biased coin is used, while in the
game B two biased coins are used corresponding to the
player’s current capital. When a player plays individually
each game, he/she loses his/her capital on average. How-
ever, when the player plays two games in any combination,
he/she always wins on average [1],[2]. Several variations of
Parrondo’s games apparently with such paradoxical prop-
erty have been introduced; history dependence, one dimen-
sional line, two dimensional lattice and so on[3].[4],[5],[6].
In this paper, I examine whether Parrondo’s paradox
occurs or not in scale free networks(SF networks)[8], in-
stead of two dimensional lattice. This is interesting as an
empirical study, since scale free networks are a common
occurrence in our real world[9]. Here two models are dis-
cussed by both some theoretical analyses and computer
simulations. As a result, I prove that Parrondo’s paradox
occurs only in the second model. This paradox occurs by
the quite different mechanism from the original Parrondo’s
paradox.
II. PARROND GAME ON SF NETWORKS
Parrondo’s paradox occurs in sequences of games in
which a winning expectation may be obtained by playing
the games in a random order, even though each game in the
sequence may be lost when played individually. The orig-
inal version of Parrondo’s game consists of the following
two games and the initial capital of a player is C(0) = 0;
1. Game A: the probability of winning is PA in this
game. Usually PA < 0.5 is taken for losing game.
2. Game B: If the capital C(t) of the player at t is
a multiple of 3, the probability of winning is P
(1)
B ,
otherwise, the probability of winning is P
(2)
B .
3. Game A+B: Two games are mixed. The game A is
played with probability P and game B is played with
1− P .
In all there are 4 parameters, P , PA, P
(1)
B and P
(2)
B , con-
trollable by a planner of the game. When we win a game
A or B or A+B, we get one unit of capital and when we
lose the game, we lose one unit of capital.
The degree distribution of scale free networks is given by
P (k) =
(α− 1)
k1−αmin − k
1−α
max
k−α ≡ Ck−α, (1)
where α > 0 is an exponent in a power low, C is a nor-
malization constant and, kmin and kmax are the maximum
degree and the minimum one in a network [9]. . In this
paper, I construct scale free networks by using the prefer-
ential attachment (BA model) introduced by Barabashi et
al.[8] with α = 3 and kmin = 4.
When Parrondo’s game is straightforwardly extended to
the game in SF networks with degree k according to [7], the
number of parameters becomes k + 1 and that is so large.
Furthermore the degree differs in every node in scale free
networks. Then the game has too many parameters to
analyze the game theoretically. So we introduce a cutoff
R or r to introduce two types of models as the Parrondo
game on SF networks by replacing the game B as follows.
Model I: When there are not less than R winners in
players adjacent to a target player, the target player plays
the game W whose winning probability is PW , and the
target player plays the game L whose winning probability
is PL in other cases in the game B.
Model II: When there are not less than rk winners in
players adjacent to a target player, the target player plays
the game W whose winning probability is PW , and the
target player plays the game L whose winning probability
is PL in other cases in the game B.
Since Parrondo like paradox may accidentally occur in
the capital of individual because of probability game, I
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Fig.1. (PWCPL) satisfying the conditions (5) and (6) for
kmax = 25(left) and for kmax = 65(right) at R = 6.
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Fig.2. The average capitals at R = 5C(PL, PR) = (0.2, 0.6) in
the Game B (left) and the Game A+B (right) where C0) =
100.
analyze the average capital over all players as the time
series of capitals in similar manner to the game on two
dimensional lattice[7].
A. Model I
I first put to the test by a computer simulation at the
network size N = 400, P = 0.5 and R = 5 in order to
discern the outline of wide parameter space. A necessary
condition for the paradox is (PL−0.5)(PW−0.5) < 0. Com-
puter simulations are made where each player on the net-
work asynchronously plays. As results of the simulations, I
found Parrondo’s paradox does not occur in this parameter
region. Furthermore, I found that the variation of PL and
PW is only relevant to the variation of the absolute values
of CA+B(t) but does not occasion any qualitative changes
such as a reversal in capital. Much circumstantial evidence
shows that the variation of R is so. Thus the value of R is
not crucial.
Next I introduce the discriminant for the node with de-
gree k;
D(k,PW,G,PL,G) =
(1− PW,G)
k−R(1− PL,G)
R
P k−RW,G P
R
L,G
, (2)
where G takes A, B or A+B [10]. Notice that when the
degree of nodes is smaller than the cutoff R, the players on
the nodes necessarily play the game L in the game B. So
for that case, the discriminant is
D(k,PL,B) = (1− PL,B)
k/P kL,B for k < R. (3)
The payoff of Game A+B is given as
PW (L),A+B = PPA + (1 − P )PW (L),B. (4)
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Fig.3. Parrondo’s paradox in Model II with (r,PWCPL)=
(0.66,0.092,0.68), N = 1000 and C(t = 0) = 100. The left is
game B and the right is game A+B.
Players on nodes with high degree can play either the
game W or the game L depending on the number of win-
ners in neighboring players. Taking account of the minimal
degree kmin = 4 in BA model adopted in this paper, I find
a set of conditions for paradox mean field approximation;
C
( R∑
k=4
D(k,PL,B)
kα
+
k∑
k=R+1
D(k,PW,B ,PL,B)
kα
)
> 1, (5)
C
( R∑
k=4
D(k,PL,A+B)
kα
+
k∑
k=R+1
D(k,PW,A+B ,PL,A+B)
kα
)
< 1. (6)
I found several parameter sets of (PL, PW ) satisfying (5)
and (6) by numerical calculations. A few examples of data
points that satisfy the conditions (5) and (6) in the param-
eter space PW -PL are shown in Fig.1. I, however, could not
confirm that paradox really does occur by numerical cal-
culations in any parameters of them. A example of this
is given in Fig.2 where Parrondo Paradox does not surely
occur.
A. Model II
In Model II, there is not necessity to introduce (3).
Whether the Game W or L in the Game (A+)B is played
depends on the winner’s ratio adjacent to the target player.
The conditions for Parrondo paradox in his game are given
by
D(rk,PW,B ,PL,B) > 1, (7)
D(rk,PW,A+B,PL,A+B) < 1. (8)
In the parameter region that PW,B < 0.5 < PL,B and
PW,A+B < 0.5 < PL,A+B, they are
PW,B
(
1 +
PL,B
1− PL,B
)1/γ
< 1, (9)
PW,A+B
(
1 +
PL,A+B
1− PL,A+B
)1/γ
> 1, (10)
where γ = (1−r)/r. For the cases that PW,B > 0.5 > PL,B
or PW,A+B > 0.5 > PL,A+B, we have only to reverse L and
W in (9) and (10), since there is a sort of duality symmetry:
L↔W and γ ↔ 1/γ in the Game B.
So the necessary conditions that Parrondo’s paradox oc-
curs consist of 4 sets of conditions. One of necessary con-
dition is
1 > PW,B
(
1 +
PL,B
1− PL,B
)1/γ
,
PW,B < 0.5 < PL,B, P + PL,B > 1, (11)
Others are made by carrying out the duality transforma-
tion L ↔ W and γ ↔ 1/γ for each of (11). Exploring
parameters satisfying (11), we obtain a parameter set
(PA, PW,B , PW,L, r, P ) = (0.48, 0.092, 0.68, 2/3, 0.50).
They are candidate parameters for a paradox. Fig.3 actu-
ally shows that a paradox in the average capital occurs at
the parameter set where C(0) = 0 and the network size is
N = 1000.
However, since the conditions for the Parrondo’s paradox
have not any k dependence from (9) and (10), I notice that
the wining probabilities for the Game B and the Game
A+B are given by
PB = rPW,B + (1− r)PL,B , (12)
PA+B = pPA + (1− p)
(
rPW,B + (1− r)PL,B
)
.(13)
Two kinds of probabilities for the occurrence of the para-
dox were needed for any nodes in the original Parrondo
game B and so the Game A+B. Now there is, however, no
sign of the paradox in this case, because there is only one
controlled wining probability of PB. In fact substituting
(12) into (13), we obtain
PA+B = PPA + (1− P )PB = P (PA − PB) + PB. (14)
So PA+B < 0.5 for P = 0.5 or even P < 1, PA < 0.5
and 0.5 > PB . These consideration clearly show that both
game B and game A+B are losing!.
I investigate why the Parrondo’s paradox occurred in
the Fig.3. Notice that effective r is always some rational
number different from true r for a special k, since k takes
only a natural number. r takes some effective value reff
due to the discrete nature of k. For example, when the
possible winning ratios of a node with k = 4 are practically
0/4, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 and 4/4. So choosing r = 2/3, r becomes
effectively reff = rupper = 3/4 for W game. For L game, r
likewise becomes effectively reff = rdown = 2/4. Thus two
effective rs’ appear!
For the same parameters as ones in Fig.3, the effective
values of rupper and rdown can be estimated for each degree
k. We can derive PB,eff and PA+B,eff from the formula
substituted from r to reff in (12) and (13). The average
values < PB,eff > and < PA+B,eff > are given by
< PB(A+B),eff > =
∫
P (k)PB(A+B),eff (k)
=
∫
Ck−αPB(A+B),eff (k). (15)
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Fig.4. Effective winning probabilities of the Game B and A+B
in Model II with (r,PWCPL)= (2/3,0.092,0.68).
Since this value is sensitive to the normalization constant
C, I refine parameters in the present model. I first use
α = 2.57 for the network really constructed in this pa-
per, different from ideal value α = 3. Though k can take
infinite large value in itself, k really takes from kmin = 4,
which is a restriction coming from BA model, to kmax = 30
[10]. The values of PB,eff and PA+B,eff for each degree k
are described in Fig.4. The average values of PB,eff and
PA+B,eff are 0.49 and 0.503, respectively, when the nor-
malization constant evaluated from this limited region of k
is corrected to 1.051 times. Then the capitals CB(t = 1000)
and CA+B(t = 1000) are 90.8 and 105.414, respectively.
These values almost explain the capitals of the game B
and the game A+B in Fig.3 well. The exact correction for
the normalization constant without any limit of k is 1.035
which is comparable with the above value, 1.051.
There are effectively multiple r values, and so multiple
< PB,eff > and < PA+B,eff >, due to the various effective
reff . Such the effect creates Parrondo’s paradox in the
similar way as the original Parrondo’s game, but not in
different mechanism from the original one. Thus I call its
paradox the second Parrondo’s paradox.
Thus I found that Parrondo’s paradox can occur in SF
networks.
SUMMARY
In this paper, I explored whether paradox occurs or not
in Parrondo’s game on scale free networks which are more
ubiquitous in real worlds than regular networks. It is too
complicate to analyze the game in the general fashion, es-
pecially in giving theoretical considerations. So I consider
only the case with the same number of parameters as the
original Parrondo’s game based on modulo M = 3 in the
capital. In this paper, the parameter corresponding to M
in the original Parrondo’s game is the cutoff R. When the
number of winners adjacent to a target player is not more
than R, the player plays Game L with the winning proba-
bility PL,B in Game B of Parrondo’s game. Otherwise the
player plays Game W with the winning probability PW,B .
Two types of models are considered in this article. One is
the the threshold game where R takes a constant value in-
dependent of degree k. Another is the threshold ratio game
where R depends on degree ki of node i such as Ri = rki.
r means the ratio of winners to all players adjacent to the
player on node i.
For the threshold game, I accumulated circumstantial
evidence that paradox does not occur by some computer
simulations. Furthermore I almost practically showed that
Parrondo’s paradox did not occur in this naive case from
theoretical point with numerical experiments of view. It,
however, remains to be studied whether some paradox ac-
tually does not occur in excessively large scale networks.
I showed that a paradox occurred for some parameter set
in the threshold ratio model. In this case, the discrete na-
ture of k effectively induces plural winning probabilities in
game B as the original Parrondo’s game. It is thought that
the various PB,eff or PA+B,eff appearing in this model cre-
ate the paradox. The plural winning probabilities in game
B are not given artificially as the setting of the game but
they are effectively induced by the discrete nature of k. So
I called the paradox the second Parrondo’s paradox.
I never showed that it was hard to create Parrondo’s
paradox in scale free networks, generally. Notice that the
networks that I studied is only BA models and only stud-
ied excessively naive setting in game B. I only focus my
attention on the numbers or the ratio of winners, and not
on degree or the number of losers (notice that considering
both the number of losers and winners turns out to con-
sider degree and the number of winners as well). If making
efficient use of these information, we would find more rich
aspects of Parrondo’s paradox in various types of scale free
networks.
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